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Organizations use procedures to influence or control the behavior of their workers, 
but often have no basis for determining whether an additional rule, or procedural 
control will be beneficial. This paper outlines a proposed method for determining if 
the addition or removal of procedural controls will impact the occurrences of critical 
consequences. 
The proposed method focuses on two aspects: how valuable the procedural 
control is, based on the inevitability of the consequence and the opportunity to 
intervene; and how likely the control is to fail, based on five procedural design 
elements that address how well the rule or control has been Defined, Assigned, 
Trained, Organized and Monitored-referred to as the DATOM elements. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Organizations frequently find themselves mired by rules that have questionable 
value. Often these rules are the result of a knee-jerk reaction to failures, near misses 
or even successes, with the organization layering on additional rules to address 
circumstances that are perceived as significant. Unfortunately, these organizations 
rarely reconsider these rules later, at best allowing unnecessary rules to clutter the 
policies and procedures that govern workers, or in the worst case, leaving rules that 
confuse workers and lead to undesired behavior. 
After the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, NASA had reason to believe such 
clutter existed in the policies governing space shuttle ground processing work 
instructions. In response, a method was sought to systematically evaluate the rules 
in place-both to determine if some rules could be consolidated or eliminated, and 
also to ensure that there was no false sense of security where the abundance of rules 
masked uncontrolled risks. 
The resulting method was structured to examine any critical process; in the case 
of the Space Shuttle Program, it was directed at activities where loss of life or of a 
space shuttle vehicle was possible. The general case addressed physical controls 
(i.e., barriers) as well as rules, or procedural controls. However, the scope of the 
current work is limited to the applications on procedural controls because the 
transactional nature of shuttle ground processing depends overwhelmingly on 
people performing the right task in the right way at the right time. 
The Control Assessment method explicitly considers the risk associated with 
each rule in the process individually to determine if that particular rule reduces risk, 
increases it, or has no significant impact. The risk assessment is based on two main 
factors: how valuable the rule is at preventing a critical consequence and how likely 
the rule is to fail under the real-world conditions that exist when it is calIed on to 
function. 
Control Value describes how necessary the function of that control is. Necessity 
is determined based on how inevitable the consequence is in the absence of any 
control, and if the control leaves sufficient opportunity to intervene once an 
initiating event has occurred. 
Failure Likelihood depends on how well the control has been designed, which is 
based on how well it is defined, assigned, trained, organized and monitored. Each 
of these five elements, which can be remembered with the acronym DATOM, are 
necessary for the sustained performance of the control, with deficiencies in any area 
contributing to the likelihood that the control will fail. 
BACKGROUND 
During the investigation of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, NASA began· 
three distinct efforts. The debris recovery in west Texas and the reconstruction of 
the recovered hardware were the higher profile tasks because the proximate, 
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physical causes would have been evident from an analysis of the debris. The 
National Transportation and Safety Board was consulted because the NTSB 
performs similar reconstructions of conventional aircraft mishaps to analyze the 
causes, and their methods and experience were expected to help speed the 
investigation. 
The less visible task involved a complete review of the work instructions written 
during the prior two processing flows of Columbia, for the STS-I09 and STS-I07 
missions. The review was intended to find any technical errors made by ground 
processing personnel that could have contributed to the accident. In its report, the 
Columbia Accident Investigation Board noted that in the roughly 16,500 work 
documents reviewed, there were no findings or observations that contributed to the 
accident. However, the board did note an accuracy rate of 99.75%, leaving a small 
number of work documents with "Technical Observations (technical concerns or 
process ·issues), and Documentation Observations (minor errors)" that revealed 
procedural issues (CAIB, 20(3). 
Interviews with the engineers who wrote the work documents revealed that 
many of the observations identified' in the review were associated with rule 
interpretations. In some cases, rules still technically in-place could no longer be 
followed as-written or no longer provided the benefit intended because of process 
changes made since the rules were created. Other observations involved situations 
where a process improvement clearly implemented a better way of performing the 
function and the old rule was just never removed from the policy. 
In light of the "Can-Do" culture in place at the Kennedy Space Center 
(Vaughan, 1996), it really comes as no surprise that technicians and inspectors on 
the floor would continue working when faced with some of these situations. It 
would be wasteful to stop working because a document that clearly described the 
task didn't comply with a formatting rule that no longer applied. There would be no 
value added by 'correcting' to comply with a rule intended for manually-typed 
instructions that had been phased out by the use of a computer-based authoring 
process several years before. 
The real surprise is that errors like these weren't more common. Directions for 
engineers writing work instructions were distributed between 37 policy documents, 
so while one could argue the overwhelming compliance with obscure, redundant 
and ambiguous rules is somewhat wasteful, it is a testament to the thoroughness of 
those engineers that the accuracy was so high. . 
RISK DEFINITION 
Typically, risk is defined in terms of failure likelihood and consequence severity of 
an outcome (Kumamoto and Henley, 1996), which in principle enables the expected 
loss or risk to be computed. Kaplan and Garrick's (1981) approach to 
understanding risk is based on obtaining answers to a triplet of questions: "What 
can go wrong?" "What are the consequences?" "What is the likelihood?" represents 
a more generalized approach to risk assessment that quantifies any hazard on an 
absolute scale. In the proposed approach to defining risk, which is in terms of 
control value and failure likelihood, the key points that differentiate it from the 
general case are that the analysis is limited to only consequences that the 
organization considers critical and that it provides an indication of relative risk 
between possible options. Thus this approach helps to effectively target ~he relevant 
factors when the scope of the assessment is limited. 
By choosing 'critical' consequences as those which, if they occur, would 
threaten the existence of the organization, then any practical need for quantification 
is eliminated. In essence, if any critical hazard is realized, it could mean the end of 
the organization. In the case of the Space Shuttle Program, loss of another vehicle 
would almost definitely result in the immediate and permanent termination of 
operations (Block, 2008). While loss of a life would probably not result in the 
premature end of the program, it would impact the career ofthe decision maker who 
allowed the circumstances to exist. A parallel example from another industry would 
be a death resulting from surgical malpractice---'---the hospital may not choose to 
select this as a critical consequence because a single fataIi~ would present a 
minimal threat to its existence, but if the Control Assessment was being performed 
by the surgeon it would almost definitely be critical. 
Another'important assumption regarding risk that must be addressed before 
proceeding is that the assessment does not attempt to provide an aggregate measure 
of risk, but instead addresses the differences between alternatives, asking the 
questions: "what is the benefit derived from the presence of this rule?", or "is rule A 
better than rule B?" Techniques like Probabilistic Risk Assessment attempt to 
account for all risks faced by the organization (Kumamoto and Henley, 1996), but 
the intent of the Control Assessment is to only consider those items that can be 
controlled. Consider the hazardous release of chemicals due to a railway accident. 
There is a small but real risk to a factory adjacent to the rail-line, but the manager of 
the factory wouldn't be expected to try controlling that risk. Such a risk could be 
controlled at the corporate level though, so a Control Assessment there might look 
at the task of selecting new facility locations. 
CONTROL VALUE 
The way Control Assessment considers the value of the control being e'xamined is 
to evaluate the inevitabili~ of the critical consequence in the absence of the control 
and the opportuni~ to intervene should something go wrong. A control to prevent a 
consequence that would only happen occasionally is less valuable than a control to 
avoid an inevitable consequence. Likewise, a control that leaves ample opportuni~ 
for an active response would be less valuable than one where the consequence 
would be immediate. 
To illustrate the impact of inevitabili~ on value, consider two circumstances for 
a control the Department of Transportation could put in place on Interstate 
Highways. The design standard could be changed to require runaway truck ramps 
on all interstates to address the hazard of failed brakes on trucks. Obviously, a ramp 
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on steep section of road winding down through the mountains in Colorado would be 
far more valuable than on a straight and level section of road in the middle of 
Kansas farmland. On the s~eep road, a serious accident would be near inevitable 
because the lack of brakes would result in an increase in the speed of the truck, and 
impact with other vehicles that were under control. On the level road, the truck's 
speed would not increase and the vehicle could conceivably be allowed to come to a 
stop after running out of fuel, with no intervention necessary. 
Opportunity to intervene can easily be seen in an example from space shuttle 
operations. Hypergolic rocket propellants are reactive enough that they will 
combust on contact, so no ignition system is required, allowing simpler and lighter 
thrusters to be used on the orbiter. On the other hand, the highly reactive chemicals 
pose a serious health risk to personnel; therefore one control in place at Kennedy 
Space Center restricts access to facilities when hypergols are being actively 
handled. A worker who entered the launch pad perimeter would have to cross an 
open field before getting close enough to operations to enter a dangerous 
concentration of propellant vapors. In the Orbiter Processing Facility, the hanger 
where maintenance and refurbishment of the orbiters is performed, a worker could 
be exposed to a hazardous concentration immediately upon entering. 
In both cases, the controLis necessary because a critical consequence would be 
inevitable during times that a hazardous concentration existed. However, the control 
value is much lower at the pad because there would be more opportunity to act once 
the worker enters the facility. 
Whereas the Control Value can be used to explain where circumstances beyond 
the control of the organization are responsible for infrequent occurrences of critical 
consequences, the likelihood portion of the risk can be used to address the 
likelihood of the control failing. Rather than seeking an expected-value to describe 
risk, the procedural risk model focuses on whether the controls accomplish their 
intended function. 
FAILURE LIKELIHOOD 
Determining how often controls fail involves looking at the failure mechanisms 
of the controls. The most obvious case of a control that will not affect a worker's 
behavior is when the worker has a negative intent. Damage resulting from 
someone who intends to do harm by sabotage is outside the scope of control 
assessment because it is not the result of a control failure. Malicious compliance, 
on the other hand, is when an employee with a negative intent complies with a 
procedure they believe to be ineffective or counter-productive to the goals of the 
organization. This malicious compliance presents a procedural risk because the 
flawed procedure contains ineffective or failed controls-a worker who is aware 
that the procedure is not correct but who nonetheless follows the procedure would 
not be executing the actions desired by the organization but would be safe from 
reprisal. 
Malicious compliance is a special case of the first way controls can fail: by not 
clearly agreeing with the organization's expectations. A control that is ambiguous 
or conflicts with expectations will leave a worker unaware of the correct action to 
perform, or in the case of a malicious worker, provide a plausible excuse for acting 
against the best interests of the organization. 
The second way controls can fail is to instruct the worker to perform an action 
they are unable to, either by providing insufficient details or identifying actions that 
cannot be performed under the time or resource constraints. The classic example of 
this second control failure is the production vs. quality conflict. Turning out high 
volumes of a product increase profit, but the need for oversight or inspection to 
ensure delivery of satisfactory products often slows production. 
The final way controls can fail is by calling for actions that are harmful to the 
worker. A worker who is aware of what harm may come will not proceed with the 
action. Usually, such a situation will also be in contlict with the goals of the 
organization because the costs associated with the organization's liability in such a 
case could harm the organization as well. 
In each of these situations, the worker performs a different action than expected 
or refrains from performing any action. An unaware worker may happen to perform 
the correct action, but that is treated here as an incorrect action-it is not a desired 
mode of operating to count on happenstance to ensure that workers act correctly. 
Although these three failure scenarios describe how.a process fails, they are not 
practical for facilitating an analysis of procedural risk because the level of 
specification is too general; that is, failures are specified to be the result of badly 
selected or incompletely described controls. Further specification is necessary to 
describe the process in useful terms. To accomplish this objective, it is proposed 
that Control Assessment consider a set of characteristics to describe a process based 
on five of six basic questions: what? why? when? how? where? and who? 'Why' is 
excluded because it does not describe the process, but provides rationale for its 
existence. Providing this rationale can be helpful in motivating the workers who 
will be performing the task, but is not strictly necessary for successful task 
completion. 
DATOM and Failure Likelihood 
DATOM, the model that uses the five elements---define, assign, train, organize and 
monitor-to fully describe a process was based on the "5 Ws." The original intent 
behind use of the model was as a tool for process design, but it also had vaJue as a 
means of spotting where incomplete processes could fail. 
Whether designing a new process or examining an existing one, the first step in 
describing the process is to define the actions that are expected to take place. 
'What' must be firmly established for the action to be part of a process. Without an 
overarching scheme, a worker will not reliably perform an action or sequence of 
actions to provide the needed output. Defining the 'what' involves deciding on the 
extent of the actions involved with the task, along with choosing or identifying the 
parameters that control the task actions. 
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The unique skills and li~itations of the workers influence the 'how' 'when' and 
'where' so 'who' must be addressed before progressing to the other remaining 
questions. Without clearly identifying 'who' will be assigned to the task, some 
level of confusion is inevitable because of the assumptions that must be made by the 
participants. However, problems persist even when there is an explicit assignment. 
An action may be consistently performed by the same worker under normal 
circumstances, but a substitution creates opportunities for misunderstanding. A 
substitute worker who is capable of performing the task may be unaware that a 
particular action needs to be performed, or may assume that the action is performed 
by another worker. 
Once the task has been defined and a worker has been assigned to perform that 
task, 'how' the worker will perform the task becomes relevant. For the task to be 
effectively performed, the worker needs training in the process knowledge specific 
to the task and in the skills required to perform the expected actions. 
'Where' and 'when' the task will be performed are linked together because both 
are limited by the defined process sequence. Some aspects of 'how' are similarly 
constrained, particularly in the context of tools, equipment, and other supporting 
resources. These three items together describe how the process is organized and 
determine the efficiency, quality, and safety of the process if a trained worker is 
assigned to the task. 
The links between the 'when,' 'where' and 'how' demonstrate the shortcomings 
with simply using the five questions as the criteria for evaluating a process. In 
contrast, Control Assessment does not attempt to split the operational details of task 
performance, leaving the answers to those three questions together under the 
concept of how well the task is organized. 
This restructuring of the five questions resulted in the rough approximation of 
what became DA TOM. The answer to 'what' is equivalent to the Define element 
and 'who' provides the Assign information. 'How' is split between Train and 
Organize, with the remainder of Organize coming from 'when' and 'where'. 
Failures within these four elements can cause failures of the process, but they do 
not provide feedback on whether the process actually produces the desired results. 
Without some form of check, the process will be vulnerable to' changes in the 
inputs, the environment, or interpretations of the wording of the documented rules. 
Based on this need, Monitor is the necessary final element in the process evaluation 
criteria, even though it cannot itself cause a failure in a fully defined process. 
The concept of monitoring includes activities that report on the 'health' of the 
process but are independent of the process itself. Inspection activities are similar 
but differ in a subtle and significant way from monitoring. Where inspections 
address quality during a specific instance of procedure execution, monitoring does 
not rely on acceptance criteria to determine if corrective action must be taken. 
A nonconformance resulting from known and accepted process variation would 
need remedial action for that specific case, but no corrective action would be 
necessary as a process 'fix.' For example, consider a drilling operation where it's 
possible for the first hole to be drilled under-sized before the bit heats up from use. 
An undersized hole would be cause to reject the part, but it would not necessarily 
happen frequently enough to be worth the costs of changing the process. 
Monitoring, on the other hand, may catch a deficient process that is still producing 
conforming output. No short-term action would be needed but the process failure 
would eventually need to be corrected to prevent nonconformances. An example of 
this could be a machinist who makes a progressively larger, undocumented 
adjustment to a setting to compensate for a bad indicator on the machine-the 
output will conform, but the process is not sustainable. 
SIGNIFICANCE 
Since procedures are an organization's "mechanisms, techniques and processes that 
have been consciously and purposefully designed in order to try to control the 
organizational behavior" (Johnson and Gill, 1993), they are also the primary means 
for an organization to prevent the consequences that result from undesired action. 
The proposed method of considering procedures represents an attempt to understand 
not just if procedures are communicated effectively, but to see the procedure in 
context as an attempt at controlling workers' actions. 
By using Control Value to understand if the organization's efforts have the 
potential to prevent or mitigate consequences and Failure Likelihood to determine if 
that potential is being realized, it should be possible for any organization to see if 
the actions taken by its workers to reduce a risk are succeeding. The technique 
won't provide the absolute measure of risk that a Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
would return, but it will allow the organization to see the relative impact on risk 
associated with the presence or absence of each control in its critical procedures. 
The ultimate goal of utilizing the proposed technique is the development of a 
reliable tool that can be used to understand the relative risks when comparing 
alternative procedural controls. Using this tool, an organization could determine 
which rule among possible alternatives most effectively reduces risk. Similarly, the 
tool could be used when adding or removing a control to provide context to the 
change, particularly if the control under review is compared against existing 
controls intended to protect against the same hazard. 
A series of validation exercises are under way within the workforce responsible 
for space shuttle ground processing and the initial results indicate that personnel 
with experience in a process can score a procedural control's elements-
inevitability, opportunity for intervention, definition, assignment, training, 
organization and monitoring-consistently with the opinions of control value and 
failure likelihood provided by experts in risk assessment. The final configuration of 
the resulting tool is yet to be determined, but it appears that an assessment of 
procedural controls could be performed by a small group with expert knowledge of 
the process being assessed, facilitated by one who is familiar with the assessment 
technique, similar to the performance of a HAZOP analysis (AIChE, 1992). 
[Type text] 
REFERENCES 
AIChE (American Institute of Chemical Engineers), (1992). Guidelines for Hazard 
Evaluation Procedures: Second Edition with Worked Examples. New York, NY: 
Center for Chemical Process Safety. 
Block, R. (2008). NASA Chief: Odds grow for shuttle catastrophe. Orlando Sentinel. 
September 5, 2008 
CAIB (Columbia Accident Investigation Board). (2003). Columbia Accident Investigation 
Board Report. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office 
Johnson P. and Gill J. (1993). Management Control and Organisational Behavior. London: 
Paul Chapman Publishing Ltd. 
Kaplan, S. and Garrick, B. 1. (1981). On the Quantitative Definition of Risk. Risk Analysis, 
1(1),11-27. 
Kumamoto, H. and Henley, E. J. (1996). Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Management for 
Engineers and Scientists. Piscattaway, NJ: IEEE Press 
Vaughan, D. (1996). The Challenger Launch Decision - Risky Technology, Culture and 
Deviance at NASA. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 
Copyright © 2010 by United Space Alliance, LLC. These materials are sponsored 
by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration under Contract 
NNJ06V AO 1 C. The U.S. Government retains a paid-up, nonexclusive, irrevocable 
worldwide license in such materials to reproduce, prepare, derivative works, 
distribute copies to the public, and perform publicly and display publicly, by or on 
behalf of the U.S. qovernment. All other rights are reserved by the copyright 
owner. 
